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It has recently been observed that certain objects, when viewed or imagined in isolation, evoke a strong
sense of three-dimensional local space surrounding them (space-deﬁning (SD) objects), while others do
not (space-ambiguous (SA) objects), and this is associated with engagement of the parahippocampal cor-
tex (PHC). But activation of the PHC is classically associated with scene stimuli. The comparable neural
response within PHC to both full scenes and single SD objects, led us to hypothesise that SD objects might
play a more critical role in the construction and maintenance of scene representations than SA objects. To
test this we used scene construction and deconstruction paradigms, where participants gradually built
and maintained scenes using SD, SA and background (wall, ﬂoors) items. By examining the order in which
each item was added (and later removed) to (and from) a scene, we could estimate the signiﬁcance of
each item type. In two different experiments, participants chose SD over SA objects and background items
as the ﬁrst and most critical item in their constructed scenes and, more generally, selected SD objects ear-
lier than SA objects across the scene construction process. When deconstructing scenes, participants
retained signiﬁcantly more SD objects than SA objects, and the last remaining object across all scenes
was highly likely to be an SD object. SD objects therefore enjoy a privileged role in scene construction
and maintenance, and appear to be an essential building block of scenes.
 2013 Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
For many years, vision, cognitive, and neuro-scientists have
studied the nature, perception and memory of scenes (Bar, 2004;
Biederman, 1972; Biederman, Mezzanotte, & Rabinowitz, 1982;
Bisiach & Luzzatti, 1978; Enns & Rensink, 1990; Epstein & Kanwish-
er, 1998; Henderson & Hollingworth, 1999; Intraub & Richardson,
1989; Mandler & Parker, 1976; Oliva & Schyns, 1997; Potter & Faul-
coner, 1975). The identiﬁcation of a region in posterior parahippo-
campal cortex (PHC), which appears to be preferentially responsive
to topographic information (Aguirre, Detre, Alsop, & D’Esposito,
1996) and scene stimuli (Epstein, Harris, Stanley, & Kanwisher,
1999; Epstein & Kanwisher, 1998), has focused much attention on
the neural mechanisms underpinning scene processing. However,
what speciﬁc scene attributes are represented within the PHC has
been widely debated (Ranganath & Ritchey, 2012), and numerous
hypotheses, which focus on different aspects of scenes, have been
proposed. These include their spatial layout or global structure (Ep-
stein, 2008; Epstein et al., 1999; Park, Brady, Greene, & Oliva, 2011;
Walther, Chai, Caddigan, Beck, & Fei-Fei, 2011), contextual (Bar,
2004; Bar, Aminoff, & Schacter, 2008) or categorical (Naselaris,ly), e.maguire@ucl.ac.uk (E.A.
 license.Prenger, Kay, Oliver, & Gallant, 2009; Walther, Caddigan, Fei-Fei,
& Beck, 2009) information, scene novelty (Howard, Kumaran, Olafs-
dottir, & Spiers, 2011), or navigational relevance (Janzen & van
Turennout, 2004). Moreover, the distinctive network of brain re-
gions (which includes the PHC), activated when participants ac-
tively imagine complex, coherent scenes (Hassabis, Kumaran, &
Maguire, 2007; Summerﬁeld, Hassabis, &Maguire, 2010), recall epi-
sodic memories, plan for the future or engage in spatial navigation
(Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Schacter, Ad-
dis, & Buckner, 2008; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009), suggests that
understanding scene processing in regions such as PHC may be
key to elucidating a range of cognitive functions (Hassabis & Magu-
ire, 2007, 2009).
In a recent study Mullally and Maguire (2011) offered an alter-
native account of PHC function (see Kravitz, Peng, & Baker, 2011;
and Doeller & Kaplan, 2011, for related discussions), proposing that
the PHC is selectively engaged by representations that depict local
three-dimensional space. Scenes, by their very nature, invariably
encompass this. However, Mullally and Maguire (2011) reported
that certain types of objects, when imagined or viewed in isolation,
evoked a strong sense of three-dimensional local space surround-
ing them. Such objects were identiﬁed as ‘space-deﬁning’ (SD) ob-
jects, whereas objects that did not evoke this impression were
referred to as ‘space-ambiguous’ (SA) objects. Critically when the
neural responses to these two object categories were compared,
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served associated speciﬁcally with the SD objects (Fig. 1). Impor-
tantly, this response was not explained simply by object size
alone (Konkle & Oliva, 2012) or contextual associations (Bar
et al., 2008). The location of this PHC activation mirrored that typ-
ically observed when scene stimuli are compared to single objects
(Epstein & Kanwisher, 1998; Epstein et al., 1999; O’Craven & Kanw-
isher, 2000). Thus, Mullally and Maguire (2011) argued that the
three-dimensional space inherently present in scenes but also evi-
dent at a more local level in relation to SD objects, may represent
the key attribute processed by the PHC (see also Zeidman, Mullally,
Schwarzkopf, & Maguire, 2012).
The question remains however, as to whether SD objects are
behaviourally relevant to scenes in a way that SA objects are not.
In order to examine the relationship between SD objects and
scenes, we adapted a technique previously devised by Summer-
ﬁeld et al. (2010), where participants were required to construct
indoor scenes in the mind’s eye, item-by-item. The items pre-
sented to participants were typical household objects and back-
ground elements (such as walls and ﬂoors). The incremental
presentation of items ensured that the scene construction process
was ‘slowed-down’ into distinct steps which could then be individ-
ually interrogated. Using this paradigm, we had participants con-
struct scenes in the imagination, using a combination of SD and
SA objects (Experiment 1), plus background items (ExperimentFig. 2. Example stimuli. Example stimulus for Experiment 1 comprised of SD and S
Fig. 1. Brain areas engaged by imagining SD relative to SA objects. Activations at the le
panel) images on the averaged structural MRI scan of the 21 subjects from the Mullally a
voxel. L = left side of the brain.2). The order in which the items were presented was not predeter-
mined. Instead, on each trial participants were presented with a
written description of the items simultaneously, and constructed
their scenes, item-by-item, while noting the order in which the
items were added to their imagined constructions (Fig. 2). The par-
ticipants’ overall goal was to achieve the impression of a real-
world scene as early in the scene construction process as possible.
Thus, by examining the order in which participants chose to add
items into their constructions, the category of items considered
to be the most inﬂuential in the construction of scenes was re-
vealed. We hypothesised that SD objects would be selected earlier
in the scene construction process than either SA objects (Experi-
ments 1 and 2) or background items (Experiment 2). In addition,
we asked participants to subsequently deconstruct their imagined
scenes. This enabled us to examine which object category was
most critical in the maintenance of scenes. Again, we predicted
that as participants sought to preserve their scene constructs, SD
objects would be retained more often than either SA objects or
background items.
Despite the extensive research that has been performed on
scenes over the last ﬁve decades this is, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst
study exploring how mentally generated scene representations are
speciﬁcally constructed and maintained, and the SD/SA categorisa-
tion enabled us to elucidate the signiﬁcance of three-dimensional
local space in this process.A items, and for Experiment 2 comprised of SD, SA and background elements.
vel of the peak left PHC voxel are shown on sagittal (left panel) and coronal (right
nd Maguire (2011) study. The colour bar indicates the z-scores associated with each
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2.1. Participants
Forty healthy volunteers participated in the study; 20 in Exper-
iment 1 (11 females; mean age 25.5 years; StD 3.88) and 20 in
Experiment 2 (15 females; mean age 25.7 years; StD 4.72). All par-
ticipants had normal or corrected to normal vision, were ﬂuent
English speakers, and gave informed written consent in accordance
with the local research ethics committee.
2.2. Stimuli
As part of the Mullally and Maguire (2011) study, descriptions
of 399 everyday indoor items were rated for SD/SA across a series
of behavioural experiments. The items used here were drawn from
the stimuli that were rated as most strongly SD and SA in that
study.
2.2.1. Experiment 1
On each of 20 trials, participants were presented with written
descriptions of ﬁve objects found in typical indoor household
scenes (Fig. 2). Participants were initially required to imagine each
of these ﬁve objects in isolation, and to later attempt to construct
and subsequently deconstruct scene representations in the mind’s
eye using these ﬁve objects (see the Sections 2.3 and 2.4 below).
Thus, participants imagined a total of 20 scenes, 10 of which con-
tained three SD objects and two SA objects (‘Type 1’) and ten of
which contained two SD objects and three SA objects (‘Type 2’).
By using equal number of both scene types we ensured that any
preference for either SD or SA objects was not being driven by an
over-representation of either object category in the given scenes.
All objects were accompanied by one or two adjective descriptors
(e.g. ‘a pine bedside table’). Participants were unaware of the SD/SA
distinction.
2.2.2. Experiment 2
The stimulus set from Experiment 1 was extended in Experi-
ment 2 to include background items (Fig. 2). Ten scenes were
now comprised of three SD objects and two SA objects (as before),
plus one additional background item (e.g. ‘a dark stone ﬂoor’ or ‘a
light yellow wall’; ‘Type 1’; whereby 5 trials included a wall ele-
ment and 5 a ﬂoor element). Ten scenes involved two SD objects,
three SA objects, and one background item (‘Type 2’; 5 trials in-
cluded a wall element and 5 a ﬂoor element). An additional ten
scenes were also included (‘Type 3’), which contained two SD ob-
jects, two SA objects, and two background items (1 wall element
and 1 ﬂoor element on each trial). Again, all objects and back-
grounds were accompanied by one or two adjective descriptors.
As in Experiment 1, these new participants were unaware of the
SD/SA distinction.
2.3. Scene construction
Participants had to incrementally construct scenes in the mind’s
eye. In order to explain the term ‘scene’, participants were asked to
imagine the waiting room in which they had just been sitting. They
reﬂected upon the fact that what they imagined in their mind’s eye
was not a collection of separate objects occurring in isolation and
devoid of context, but instead a fully integrated scene that con-
tained these items. They were informed that the goal of this re-
search was to ascertain how the brain puts together all the
individual items within a scene (such as objects, walls and ﬂoors)
to enable us to imagine and attain these seamless impressions of
scenes in our mind. They were therefore encouraged to focus theirattention on the transition from imagining a collection of single
items to imagining the items integrated together into a coherent
scene. The task began with participants imagining each object,
one at a time, in isolation, in as much detail as possible and against
a blank background. This was followed by the scene construction
process. Here, participants imagined a ‘clean slate’ (i.e. they imag-
ined the ﬁrst item without any background context) after which
they gradually built up the scene, item-by-item, ideally endingwith
the impression of a fully integrated, realistic and coherent scene.
Each scene had to be constructed using the ﬁve (Experiment 1)
or six (Experiment 2) individual items provided and no others. Par-
ticipants were therefore explicitly informed that they were not
permitted to imagine any additional items or structures in their
constructed scenes. This was emphasised a number of times
throughout the task instructions, as was the requirement to start
each trial with a blank background. Furthermore, participants were
informed that the ultimate goal of the task was to attain the
impression that what they were imagining was a scene, or in other
words, a space that they could plausibly encounter in the real
world. Critically for the task at hand, participants were instructed
that they should attempt to attain this goal as early in the con-
struction process as possible. On each trial, a description of the
items was presented in typed form, on one page of white A4 paper,
divided into three columns (Fig. 2). In this way, all ﬁve (Experiment
1) or six (Experiment 2) items were visible simultaneously. The
task was therefore to select the items which were most helpful
to them in attaining this impression of a coherent scene (in con-
trast to isolated single objects). The ﬁrst item (i.e. the item that
the participant considered to be the most important in helping to
construct the scene) was imagined in isolation and against a blank
background and was marked ‘1st’ by participants on the scoring
sheet. The second item (marked 2nd by participants) was therefore
the item that participants considered to be the next most impor-
tant. This second item was imagined and integrated with the ﬁrst
item that had already been imagined. In this way, the procedure
was repeated until all ﬁve (Experiment 1) or six (Experiment 2)
items had been integrated into the scene. Finally, it was empha-
sised prior to starting the task that participants should try to imag-
ine the scenes being built up in front of them, as if they were
standing in an open doorway, so that the distance between them
and the items in the scene was constant and unchanging.
Trials where participants were unable to construct a scene
using the items provided, or without adding in additional items/
structures, were excluded (trials excluded: Experiment 1, 0%;
Experiment 2, 1.67%). The items selected to be imagined ﬁrst
(and therefore considered to be the most inﬂuential and important
in establishing the scene) were assigned the highest score (i.e. ‘5’ in
Experiment 1 and ‘6’ in Experiment 2). The second selected item
was assigned the second highest scores (i.e. ‘4’ in Experiment 1
and ‘5’ in Experiment 2) and so on, until the last selected item
was assigned the lowest score (i.e. ‘1’ in both Experiments 1 and
2). The average scores associated with the SD and SA objects
(and background items in Experiment 2) in each scene trial were
then calculated, providing a ‘mean signiﬁcance score’ for each item
type in the scene construction process.
2.4. Scene deconstruction
Following the construction of all scenes (20 in Experiment 1 and
30 in Experiment 2), participants were presented with the same
scenes (one at a time) and informed that this time they would be
asked to both construct and then deconstruct each scene. The
scenes were presented in exactly the same manner as before, with
the exception that the presentation order of items differed from
phase 1. Participants were told not to attempt to remember the
order in which they had constructed each scene in the previous
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scribed items. Construction order was not noted in this phase.
The deconstruction process was then broken into two parts. Partic-
ipants were ﬁrst asked to identify and remove any items which
they felt they could afford to take away from that scene without
altering the scene’s vividness in their imagination, or compromis-
ing the sense that what they were visualising was a deﬁnite indoor
scene. They indicated their selection by placing an ‘x’ beside the
items they wished to remove from the scene, leaving only the core
scene items, the combination of which was sufﬁcient to create the
impression of a scene (or a real-world space) in their mind’s eye.
This step enabled the structure of these core scenes (in terms of
the proportion of SD, SA and background items contained within
them) to be identiﬁed. Next, they were asked to remove the core
items (one at a time) until just one item was left. Participants were
informed that this would cause the scene to disintegrate but that
they should attempt to remove the items in such a way that some
impression of the scene was preserved for as long as possible. Par-
ticipants marked the order in which they removed each item and
highlighted the last remaining item. The proportion of SD, SA and
background (Experiment 2) items retained last by participants in
each of the scenes was calculated. This enabled a comparison
across the three item categories to be made. As in the scene con-
struction process, trials where participants were unable to decon-
struct a scene were excluded (trials excluded: Experiment 1, 0%;
Experiment 2, 0.83%).
2.5. Data analysis
The data were analysed using paired t-tests. In the case of the
ranked scene construction data, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test
for repeated measures data was utilised. Alpha was set at 0.05,
and all analyses were corrected for multiple comparisons using
the Bonferroni correction.3. Results
3.1. Experiment 1
3.1.1. Scene construction
SD objects scored higher (mean = 3.79, StD = 0.31) than SA ob-
jects (mean = 2.25, StD = 0.18; z = 3.92, p < 0.001), suggesting that
SD objects were selected earlier than SA objects in the scene con-
struction process (Fig. 3A). As the proportion of SD and SA objects
in each scene was balanced across the 20 scenes, this preference
for SD objects could not be attributed to an over-representation
of SD objects. In addition to the mean signiﬁcance score, we also
explored the item selected ﬁrst (and therefore considered to be
the most critical) in the scene construction process. Overall,
93.75% of the items selected ﬁrst were SD objects (StD 5.59%).
Thus, SD objects were signiﬁcantly more likely to be selected ﬁrst
in the scene construction process relative to SA objects (t(19) = 35,
p < 0.001; Fig. 3B).
3.1.2. Scene deconstruction
An average of 1.64 (out of a total of 5; StD 0.20) items were dis-
carded initially, suggesting that 3.36 items were required to main-
tain a scene-like representation. Next, and in order to explore the
structure of these ‘core’ scenes, the proportion of SD and SA objects
retained relative to the total number of objects in the core scenes
was calculated. Again a clear pattern emerged, whereby the core
scenes contained a signiﬁcantly greater proportion of SD objects
(mean 61.72%, StD 10.68%) than SA objects (mean 38.28%, StD
10.68%; t(19) = 4.91, p < 0.001; Fig. 3C). Finally, we assessed the pro-
portion of SD objects retained as the last item in the scene decon-struction process relative to the proportion of SA objects retained.
This analysis revealed that once the ‘core’ scene structure was
peeled away item-by-item, SD objects (mean 82.25%, StD 10.45%)
were signiﬁcantlymore likely to be retainedas theﬁnal itemrelative
to the SAobjects (mean17.75%, StD10.45%; t(19) = 13.81,p < 0.001).
This shows that not only do SD objects maintain their dominance
over SA objects in the core scenes, but that they were also consis-
tently selected as the item most critical in preserving the scene, or
an impression of real-world space, when participants were forced
to discard all other objects from the scene (see Fig. 3D).
3.1.3. Additional analyses
SD objects are typically larger than SA objects. We therefore
wondered whether size alone was driving the effects we observed.
We examined how participants dealt with the larger, free-standing
SA items that we had included in some scenes (i.e. ‘a modern
chrome ﬂoor light’; ‘a soft corduroy bean bag’). Notably, despite
their larger size, these items were not treated differently from
the SA group as a whole in the scene construction process (i.e.
mean scene construction signiﬁcance score: ﬂoor light = 2.25; bean
bag = 2.45; all SA objects = 2.25) and were readily discarded by
participants when selecting items for their core scenes (percentage
of participants who discarded each item: ﬂoor light = 55%; bean
bag = 65%). SD objects therefore seem especially important to
scenes, and this is not entirely explicable in terms of their size.
In another analysis, we used the ratings acquired in our original
study (Mullally & Maguire, 2011) to identify the largest SD object
and the smallest SA object in every scene. We then calculated
the proportion of these ‘largest SD objects’ selected ﬁrst in the
scene construction process, which was 57.75% (i.e. 57.75% of the
objects selected ﬁrst were the largest SD objects), and compared
this to the total proportion of all SD objects (regardless of size) se-
lected ﬁrst in the scene construction process (93.75%). Thus, 36% of
the SD objects selected ﬁrst in the scene construction process were
not the largest SD object available to participants, suggesting that
although clearly important, size alone is not the sole determinant
of participants’ selections. When we performed the same analysis
for the SA objects – we identiﬁed the proportion of the ‘smallest
SA objects’ selected last in the scene construction process (33%)
relative to the total number of SA objects selected last in the scene
construction process (76%) – we found that over half the SA items
selected last in the scene construction process (and therefore con-
sidered the least important) were not the smallest SA objects. Thus,
participants’ decisions were not being driven by object size alone.
3.2. Experiment 2
3.2.1. Scene construction
Just as in Experiment 1, SD objects had a greater mean signiﬁ-
cance (mean 4.31, StD 0.38) than SA objects (mean 2.68, StD
0.35; z = 4.72, p < 0.001). Moreover, the SD objects’ score was also
greater than the mean signiﬁcance score attained by the back-
ground items (mean 3.58, StD 0.40; z = 4.31, p < 0.001), despite
the fact that background items scored signiﬁcantly higher than
SA objects (z = 4.6, p < 0.001). Therefore, SD objects were selected
earlier in the scene construction process than either SA objects or
background items (Fig. 4A), and critically this preference for SD ob-
jects was preserved when equal numbers of items categories were
presented to participants (i.e. when the ten ‘Type 3’ scenes, which
contained 2 SD objects, 2 SA objects, and 2 background items each,
were analysed separately; SD > SA: z = 2.70, p < 0.05; SD > back-
grounds: z = 2.55, p < 0.05; backgrounds > SA: z = 2.50, p < 0.05.
Similarly, SD objects (mean 64.42%, StD 12.50%) were signiﬁ-
cantly more likely to be selected ﬁrst in the scene construction pro-
cess, relative to both SA objects (mean 10.25%, StD 8.06%;
t(29) = 17.05, p < 0.001) and background items (mean 26.00%, StD
Fig. 3. Results of Experiment 1. Scene construction: (A) Average ‘signiﬁcance’ scores (±SE) for the SD and SA object categories. (B) Percentage of participants who selected an
SD or an SA object ﬁrst in the scene construction process. Scene deconstruction: (C) Percentage of SD and SA objects retained in ‘core scenes’. (D) Percentage of participants
who selected an SD or an SA object as the last remaining item in the scene deconstruction process. p < 0.001.
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scored signiﬁcantly higher than SA objects (t(29) = 6.18,
p < 0.001). Again this pattern was evident when the ten ‘Type 3’
scenes were analysed separately SD > SA: t(9) = 8.78, p < 0.001;
SD > backgrounds: t(9) = 5.15, p < 0.01; backgrounds > SA: t(9) =
4.75, p < 0.01). Therefore, SD objects appeared to robustly main-
tain their dominance in the scene construction process, even when
background items were available to participants. Moreover, back-
ground items, although not as dominant as SD objects, appeared to
play a more critical role in creating an impression of a real world
space than SA objects.
3.2.2. Scene deconstruction
Participants discarded initially an average of 2.4 items (out of a
total of 6 items), leaving an average of 3.60 items (StD 0.27) in the
core scenes, comparable with Experiment 1. Moreover, and as be-
fore, the core scenes selected by participants contained a signiﬁ-
cantly larger proportion of SD (mean 52.64%, StD 9.2%) relative to
SA objects (mean 24.89%, StD 7.26%; t(29) = 10.70, p < 0.001).
Moreover, the proportion of SD objects in the core scenes was
greater than the proportion of background items [mean 23.26%,
StD 8.94%; t(29) = 10.18, p < 0.001; Fig. 4C). There was no differ-
ence in the ratio of background items and SA objects
(t(29) = 0.66, p = 0.51). When the ten ‘Type 3’ scenes were analysedalone, a similar pattern was evident (SD > SA: t(9) = 10.72,
p < 0.001; SD > backgrounds: t(9) = 5.10, p < 0.01] with the only
exception being that here there was a signiﬁcantly greater propor-
tion of background items relative to SA objects [backgrounds > SA:
t(9) = 4.51, p < 0.01]. Therefore, the core scenes selected by par-
ticipants contained more SD objects than either SA objects or back-
grounds items, and this was true irrespective of the original ratio of
items categories within the given scenes. Moreover, background
items, when presented in equal proportions to SD and SA objects
(i.e. in ‘Type 3’ scenes), were more frequently represented in the
core scenes than SA objects.
Finally, when we examined the proportion of SD, SA, and back-
ground items retained as the ﬁnal item, a clear preference for the
retention of SD objects (mean 68.8%, StD 12.61%) over both SA ob-
jects (mean 13.52%, StD 9.92%; t(29) = 14.73, p < 0.001) and back-
ground items (mean 17.35%, StD 9.7%; t(29) = 13.91, p < 0.001;
Fig. 4D) was evident. No differential preference for background
items over SA objects was observed (t(29) = 1.41, p < 0.168). An
identical pattern of results was attained when the ‘Type 3’ scenes
were analysed separately (SD > SA: t(9) = 10.0, p < 0.001;
SD > backgrounds: t(9) = 7.0, p < 0.001; backgrounds > SA:
t(9) = 1.65, p = 0.13]. Thus, participants showed a clear preference
for SD objects over both background and SA items when they were
forced to discard all other items from the scene.
Fig. 4. Results of Experiment 2. Scene construction: (A) Average ‘signiﬁcance’ scores (±SE) for each of the three item categories. (B) Percentage of participants who selected an
SD, SA or background item ﬁrst in the scene construction process. Scene deconstruction: (C) Percentage of SD, SA and background items retained in ‘core scenes’. (D)
Percentage of participants who selected an SD, SA, or background item as the last remaining item in the scene deconstruction process. p < 0.001.
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An additional analysis was possible in Experiment 2. In 20
scenes (10 ‘Type 1’ and 10 ‘Type 2’), half contained a single ﬂoor
item (e.g. ‘a pale patterned carpet’), and half contained a single wall
item (e.g. ‘a light yellow wall’). By collapsing ‘Type 1’ and ‘Type 2’
scenes together, and using the ﬂoor/wall distinction as the depen-
dent variable, the signiﬁcance of ‘wall’ and ‘ﬂoor’ background items
could be directly compared across each of the four measures dis-
cussed above. Interestingly, we observed no difference between
these two types of background items either when participants
were constructing (mean signiﬁcance scores: t(18) = 0.1, p = 0.99;
ﬁrst item selected: t(18) = 1.48, p = 0.157) or deconstructing (core
scenes: t(18) = 1.18, p = 0.25; last item remaining: t(18) = 0.30,
p = 0.76) their scenes. This suggests ﬂoors and walls were treated
similarly in the construction and maintenance of scene representa-
tions, and that neither background type alone was capable of
superseding the importance of SD objects in these processes.4. Discussion
When viewed or imagined in isolation, SD objects evoke a
strong sense of three-dimensional local space, and produce signif-
icantly greater activity in bilateral posterior parahippocampal cor-
tex than SA objects (Mullally & Maguire, 2011). This region, oftenreferred to as the parahippocampal place area (Epstein & Kanwish-
er, 1998), has long been associated with the processing of scene
stimuli. The comparable neural response within PHC to both full
scenes and single SD objects, led us to hypothesise that SD objects
might play a more critical role in the construction and mainte-
nance of scene representations than SA objects. The results of both
Experiments 1 and 2 strongly supported this hypothesis, with par-
ticipants choosing SD over SA objects as the ﬁrst and most critical
item in their constructed scenes and, more generally, selecting SD
objects earlier than SA objects across the scene construction pro-
cess. Similarly, when participants had to discard the objects they
considered to be epiphenomenal to the maintenance of a coherent
scene representation, leaving just the essential ‘core scene’, we
consistently found that participants retained signiﬁcantly more
SD objects than SA objects. This strongly suggests that SD objects
were considered to be more essential in the maintenance of
scene-like representations than SA objects. Finally, the signiﬁcance
of a single SD object over a single SA objects within a scene context
was reinforced by examining the ﬁnal item which participants
chose to retain once they had discarded all other objects from their
scene. Here we found that the last remaining object across all
scenes was most likely to be an SD object. Thus, even though par-
ticipants were unaware of the SD/SA distinction, SD objects were
considered by participants in both Experiments 1 and 2 to be more
important in the initial construction and maintenance of a real-
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ﬂoors.
That SD objects could be important for the construction and
maintenance of scene representations was an idea we deduced
based on the results of Mullally and Maguire’s (2011) study. They
found that the SD dimension of an object was best characterised in
terms of two object properties, the object’s size and the perma-
nence of its location within the environment. Therefore large ob-
jects, which rarely move, scored high on the SD dimension,
whilst smaller, less permanent, objects tended to be rated as SA.
While we found that size alone was not solely responsible for
our ﬁndings, it is nevertheless understandable why SD objects
could be fundamental constituents for scenes. SD objects provide
scene elements which remain constant across consecutive sac-
cades and different egocentric viewpoints. SD objects were clearly
invoked as the key elements with which to construct scenes by
participants in both Experiments 1 and 2.
Perhaps surprisingly, the introduction of background items (e.g.
walls and ﬂoors) into the scenes in Experiment 2 did not detract
from the superiority of the SD objects in the construction and
maintenance processes. The opposite pattern could potentially
have been expected for a number of reasons. First, the existence
of cells such as ‘‘boundary vector cells’’ (Burgess, Jackson, Hartley,
& O’Keefe, 2000; Hartley, Burgess, Lever, Cacucci, & O’Keefe, 2000;
O’Keefe and Burgess, 1996) in the subiculum (Lever, Burton, Jeewa-
jee, O’Keefe, & Burgess, 2009) and border cells in entorhinal cortex
(Solstad, Boccara, Kropff, Moser, & Moser, 2008), which are hypoth-
esised to index the animal’s position in relation to boundary items
such as walls, thereby acting as the environmental input to hippo-
campal place cells, may suggest that background items such as
walls should have of particular relevance for scenes. Moreover, it
has previously been documented that the PHC responds equally
to photographs of rooms containing furniture and the unfurnished
versions of the same rooms (i.e. empty rooms with just bare walls)
(Epstein et al., 1999). Given this, it could be argued that the most
efﬁcient strategy available to participants when constructing their
scenes (particularly in the ‘Type 3’ scenes, where each scene con-
tained both a wall and a ﬂoor item), would have been to ﬁrstly
imagine the ﬂoor and wall items to create a space or ‘empty room’,
which could later be populated with the SD and SA objects. How-
ever, previous fMRI data did not ﬁnd evidence of a strong signal
within PHC when participants imagined background items (Mull-
ally & Maguire, 2011). This contrasted with the robust and exten-
sive activations observed for SD objects in this same region
(Mullally & Maguire, 2011). We therefore hypothesised that SD ob-
jects would be more relevant and considered more important to
both scene construction and scene maintenance than background
items.
It is possible, however, that when participants visualised an SD
object, they implicitly imagined a ﬂoor beneath it, thus negating
the requirement to add an explicit ﬂoor item. SD objects appear
to exert their inﬂuence by anchoring themselves within their sur-
rounding space and therefore inherently imply a surface below
them (e.g. when you imagine a grand piano you imagine this an-
chored to a ﬂoor beneath it). Moreover, people often report that
they feel like they could walk around an SD object, and therefore
have a clear representation of the local space surrounding it. This
experience is absent when one imagines a free-standing SA object
such as a bean-bag or a tall ﬂoor light, as here participants report
feeling that these objects (when imagined in isolation) are ﬂoating
in space. Thus the key difference between an SD object and the
ﬂoor elements presented in Experiment 2 is that an SD object only
deﬁnes the local space around it, while a ﬂoor item should evoke a
representation of the whole ﬂoor and thus a much larger space. If
when creating a scene the ﬂoor is critical, then imagining a ﬂoor
item should supersede imagining an SD object in our sceneconstruction paradigm. Interestingly, this is not what we observed,
and our results instead suggest that SD objects do something with-
in a scene that ﬂoor items do not.
More speciﬁcally, we found that across each of our four mea-
sures in Experiment 2 (i.e. the scene construction mean signiﬁ-
cance score, the ﬁrst item selected, the core scene composition,
and the last item retained), participants rated SD objects as more
relevant and considered them to be more important to both scene
construction and scene maintenance than background items and
this pattern was replicated when only the ‘Type 3’ scenes were
interrogated (where the proportion of SD, SA, and background
items was equal). That is, participants consistently selected back-
ground items later during scene construction and discarded them
earlier during scene maintenance/deconstruction, than SD objects.
We propose that the presence of SD objects, which are typically
larger and permanently anchored within their environment, en-
abled participants to bypass the necessity to include boundaries
such as walls or explicit ﬂoors within their scene constructs. This
is because these SD items are theoretically capable of acting as
the environmental input to hippocampal place cells (Bird, Capponi,
King, Doeller, & Burgess, 2010). In addition, and when imagined in
multiples, SD objects should automatically construct a sufﬁciently
well-deﬁned large-scale space, which would not be signiﬁcantly
enhanced by the addition of a boundary structure (e.g. a wall).
Thus, in the presence of SD objects, boundary features such as
walls and ﬂoors may not be necessary in attaining the impression
of a real-world cohesive scene. Moreover, SD objects also have the
advantage of offering, not only the impression of real-world three-
dimension space, or of providing anchor points within that space,
but they also add semantic details to the scenes. In this way, SD ob-
jects offer a unique combination of key scene attributes that may
only be available singly from background items or SA objects.
We also wondered whether participants constructed (and
deconstructed) scenes in a purely semantic sense without any re-
gard to spatial considerations. Given the detailed instructions pro-
vided and feedback from participants post-testing, we feel that this
was unlikely. Nevertheless, we also examined those of our stimuli
that were acontextual, i.e. that did not give rise to a clear context
such as a sitting room/bedroom/kitchen. Interestingly in these
acontextual scenes participants’ reliance on SD objects early in
the scene construction process was still evident. For example, the
following scene was presented in Experiment 1 and contained
three SD objects (a canvas director’s chair, a red snooker table,
and a white free-standing bookcase) and two SA objects (a red pho-
tograph album and a large black torch). Here the ﬁrst item selected
by 60% of participants was the largest SD object (the red snooker
table), which is in keeping with overall scene construction trends.
Moreover, the mean signiﬁcance scores of the three SD objects (a
canvas director’s chair = 3.25; a red snooker table = 4.1; a white
free-standing bookcase = 3.75; overall mean = 3.7) were compara-
ble with the overall mean signiﬁcance score for the SD objects in
this experiment (3.79). In addition, these scores were clearly great-
er than those of the two SA objects (a red photograph album = 2.4;
a large black torch = 1.5; overall mean = 1.95) and it is hard to see
how the semantic value of the canvas director’s chair is greater
than the semantic value of the photo album or the torch in this
speciﬁc scene. Yet, the participants treated them differently, sug-
gesting that semantic value alone cannot explain the clear differ-
ence in how participants weighted the importance of SD and SA
objects when constructing scenes. Future experiments may illumi-
nate spatial and semantic aspects of scenes further.
It is, however, worth noting that SA objects are not irrelevant to
scenes. In fact 86.5% of the core scenes selected in Experiment 1,
and 64.5% of the core scenes in Experiment 2, contained at least
1 SA object. Therefore, the core scenes, although dominated by
SD objects, were never composed of SD objects alone. However,
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less. Perhaps SA objects offered participants the opportunity to add
ﬁner detail to their scenes that may have helped to make a speciﬁc
scene distinctive and more memorable. Nevertheless, whatever
their function, SA objects did not aid scene construction or mainte-
nance to the same degree as SD objects, or even background items.
It would be interesting in future studies to investigate whether it is
possible to construct a scene using SA objects only. If so, we
hypothesise that such scenes would be phenomenologically differ-
ent from a scene that contains both SD and SA objects, or SA and
background items.
Finally, we observed an interesting parallel in the core scenes
across Experiments 1 and 2. Despite starting with a different num-
ber of individual scenes items (5 in Experiment 1, and 6 in Exper-
iment 2), participants in both experiments retained a similar
number of items in their ‘core scenes’ (3.36 items in Experiment
1 and 3.6 items in Experiment 2). Participants therefore considered
that representations containing between three and four items were
sufﬁcient for them to maintain a vivid and coherent scene in the
mind’s eye. Similar behavioural data were reported by Summer-
ﬁeld et al. (2010) using a scene construction task (that did not con-
sider SD/SA), leading those authors to conclude that the
imagination of three combined scene elements was sufﬁcient to at-
tain a representation of a coherent, vivid scene. Moreover, using
fMRI Summerﬁeld et al. (2010) reported a distinctive biphasic pat-
tern of activity during the scene construction process, whereby re-
gions such as PHC, hippocampus, and retrosplenial cortex activated
when participants imagined the ﬁrst scene element, and then again
when they combined the third scene element with the previous
two items. Interestingly, this activity steadily declined with the
addition of additional items into the scenes. Therefore, the addition
of the third item to the scene represented a distinct time point that
speciﬁcally engaged a core scene network of brain regions, most
likely because this is the point when the true scene representation
was formed by participants. This neuroimagining evidence, cou-
pled with our participants’ willingness to discard the sixth, ﬁfth
and often fourth items from their scenes, further reinforces the
idea that a scene need only contain between three to four scene
elements for it to feel like a coherent representation of a real-world
scene. Here, we were able to pinpoint the speciﬁc type of scene ele-
ment necessary to attain this impression. We conclude that scenes,
when stripped to their most basic structure, are dominated by
items which provide participants with a sense of three-dimen-
sional space, and it is this property which appears to be an essen-
tial building block of scenes.Acknowledgment
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